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Introduction
There is little disagreement in the literature that monetary policy shocks have persistent e¤ects on output, nor that this is a consequence of prices and wages not being continuously reoptimized. There is also little disagreement that the e¤ect on output lasts longer than the typical price or wage contract. The literature tries to explain this through staggered pricing models, in the spirit of Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983) , where only a fraction of price setters reoptimize in every period. The key insight is that price setters, who are able to change their price after a monetary policy shock, realize that many prices remain …xed and therefore change their price less than they would if all prices were changed at the same time.
The central role of staggered prices in New Keynesian DSGE models has spurred an interest in investigating this issue empirically. The FK index, proposed by Fisher and Konieczny (2000) , is a measure of the degree of synchronization in price setting. This index takes a value of zero under uniform (perfect) staggering and a value of one under perfect synchronization. A principal …nding is that the degree of synchronization in price setting varies depending of the level of aggregation. A high degree of staggering is found when the FK index is applied to data that has been aggregated to a few broad product categories. For example, Dhyne et al. (2005) found that the median FK index for the euro area is 0.18 when calculated across 50 product categories. In contrast, considerable synchronization is typically found at low levels of aggregation. Using Belgian producer price data, Cornille and Dossche (2006) found that, for about 80 percent of the product categories at the NACE 4-digit level, the FK index lies between 0.25 and 0.75. 1 Thus, there is a considerable degree of synchronization within individual markets. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how partial synchronization a¤ects macroeconomic dynamics. The main question is whether staggered price models still have the ability to generate su¢ cient output persistence, once the assumption of uniform staggering is relaxed. In the …rst part of this paper, I answer this question by solving a simple, analytically tractable Taylor pricing model, where prices are …xed for two (overlapping) periods. I study how deviations from uniform staggering a¤ect the economy by varying the fraction of …rms setting their prices in odd and even periods. The main …nding is that the cumulative e¤ect on output of a monetary policy shock is a non-linear function of the degree synchronization. Small deviations from uniform staggering have small e¤ects on output persistence, but small deviations from perfect synchronization have large e¤ects.
In the second part of the paper, I extend the analysis to a general equilibrium model. To account for the fact that the degree of synchronization varies with the level of aggregation, I use a model with two levels in the demands system. There are many sectors, each sector corresponding to an individual product category. In each sector, there is a large number of …rms, each having some monopoly power because it produces a di¤erent brand. Prices are uniformly staggered at the aggregate level, but there is some degree of synchronization within sectors.
Since prices are uniformly staggered at the aggregate level, the model is always able to produce some persistence in output, regardless of the degree of synchronization at the sector level. However, the literature has recognized the need of real rigidities to create su¢ cient persistence to match the response in output found in data. Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007) emphasize that a model where the elasticity of demand varies along a …rm's demand curves, as in Kimball (1995) , and …rm-speci…c capital, where a …rm's marginal cost is an increasing function of the …rm's demand, is consistent with data. These real rigidities interact with staggering by slowing down price adjustment as demand is reallocated from price adjusters to non-adjusters. Hence, in the below, I consider a model with these sources of real rigidities.
For a plausible calibration of real rigidities, I …nd that there is much more persistence when prices at the sector level are uniformly staggered, compared to when they are perfectly synchronized. However, as in the simple two-period model, the mapping between the degree of synchronization and the persistence of the e¤ect on output is highly non-linear. Deviations from uniform staggering have small e¤ects on output. Therefore, aggregate dynamics in a model with uniform staggering may serve well as an approximation to the dynamics of a more complicated model with some degree of synchronization in price setting.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in the section below, I solve a simple two-period Taylor model analytically. The full model is presented in Section 3, and Section 4 shows the results from the numerical simulations. Section 5 presents the conclusions.
A Taylor model with an analytical solution
Assume an economic environment with a continuum of monopolistically competitive …rms, indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. The …rms are divided into two cohorts. In each cohort, prices are set every other period and …xed for two periods. The cohort consisting of price setters setting their prices in even periods encompasses a fraction 2 [0; 1] of the …rms, and the cohort consisting of price setters setting their prices in odd periods a fraction 1 . In the absence of any price setting frictions, the optimal "frictionless" time t price e p it is determined by e p it p t = y t ; > 0
where p t is the price level and y t is aggregate real activity. 2 Lower case variables denote log-deviations from steady state values. A …rm allowed to reoptimize sets its reset price p it as an average of the expected frictionless prices over the two periods the price remains …xed:
The price level is obtained by integrating over all individual prices:
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The model nests the Taylor (1980) 
where T is the sample size, t the proportion of the …rms changing their price between periods t 1 and t, and the sample mean of t , to map the value of into a measure of the degree of synchronization in price setting. In the present model the FK index is
To close the model, I assume that aggregate demand is determined by the quantity theory relation
and that money supply m t is a random walk
where " t is a white noise process with …nite variance. Substituting (5) into (1), the frictionless optimal price can be rewritten as
The degree of strategic complementarity in price setting is determined by the partial derivative of the optimal price, with respect to the price level. If < 1 prices are strategic complements and if > 1, they are strategic substitutes. It is well-known in the literature that strategic complementarity provides the basis for models with nominal rigidities to explain persistent e¤ects on output, following monetary policy shocks. As we shall see later, the degree of strategic complementarity also plays an important role for how deviations from uniform staggering a¤ect output dynamics. Under these assumptions, the model can be solved analytically. It turns out that output evolves according to the …rst order di¤erence equation:
where I is a variable taking a value of one in odd periods and a value of two in even periods, and I and ! I are given by
and
where 1 and 2 are obtained by solving the system
The details of this derivation are in Appendix A. When 6 = 1 2
, the response in output to a shock to the money supply will be di¤erent depending on whether the shock hits in an even or an odd period. To analyze the model, I start with two special cases. The …rst result pertains to the case with perfect synchronization.
Proposition 1 If = 0, then the solution to the system in (9) - (12) is given by 1 = 0, 2 = 0, ! 1 = 0, and ! 2 = 1. If = 1, then the solution is given by 1 = 0, 2 = 0, ! 1 = 1 and ! 2 = 0. If = 0 (= 1), a shock to money supply is neutral in odd (even) periods. If instead the shock occurs in an even (odd) period, all prices are …xed in advance and the shock to money supply fully transmitted into output. The e¤ect on output is not persistent, however, and output returns to steady state in the following period, when all price setters are allowed to change their prices.
The inability of monetary policy to create persistent e¤ects in output should be understood in the light of how prices are set in this economy. Combining (2) with (5) and (6), the optimal reset price can be written as
Imposing p t+1 = p t = p it , this reduces to p it = m t . This is exactly the same price that price setters would have chosen if there were no price setting frictions. Thus, the increase in money supply is completely absorbed into prices, whenever price setters are given the opportunity to (simultaneously) reoptimize. The second result pertains to the case when prices are neither strategic complements nor strategic substitutes.
Proposition 2 If = 1, then, 8 2 [0; 1], the solution to the system in (9) - (12) is given by 1 = 0, 2 = 0, ! 1 = and ! 2 = 1 .
If
= 1, the e¤ect on output following an increase in money supply in the period that the shock occurs is proportional to the fraction of non-adjusters in that period. Output however is not persistent and returns to steady state in the following period, when the …rst round of price adjustments is completed. Again, the lack of persistence is a result of price setters, whenever they are allowed to reoptimize, choosing the same price that they would have in a frictionless economy. The increase in money supply is completely absorbed into prices, once all price setters have been given the opportunity to reoptimize after the shock.
The third result pertains to the general case when prices are not perfectly synchronized and are either strategic substitutes or complements.
Proposition 3 If 2 (0; 1) and 6 = 1, then the stable solution ( 1 and 2 inside the unit circle) to the system in (13) and (14) is given by
In terms of output dynamics, this implies that ! 1 and ! 2 are always positive, while 1 and 2 are positive (negative) if < 1 (> 1).
Irrespective of whether prices are strategic complements or substitutes, an increase in the money supply has, by (8), a positive e¤ect on output. When prices are strategic complements, the adjustment in output back to steady state is sluggish. In contrast, when prices are strategic substitutes, the adjustment in output back to steady state is, because 1 and 2 are negative, oscillating. This behavior of output when prices are strategic substitutes has previously been noted by, e.g., Romer (2001) in the case of uniformly staggered prices, but generalizes to the more general case when prices are partially synchronized. Such an adjustment path is clearly counterfactual, and I therefore focus on the case when prices are strategic complements.
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In order to compare impulse responses for di¤erent values of , one needs a measure of the persistence of the e¤ect. For this purpose, it is convenient to work with the expected cumulative e¤ect on output. As discussed in Carvalho (2006) , this measure takes into account both the duration and real e¤ect of the response in output following a shock. In Appendix B I show that expected cumulative e¤ect on output, E t 1 X k=o y t+k , following an unexpected shock of size " to money supply at time t, can be written as
When the model is unable to produce persistence in output, this measure takes on a particularly simple form.
Proposition 4 If = 0, = 1 or = 1 the expected cumulative e¤ect on output is given by
If prices are perfectly synchronized, a shock to money supply is, as described in Proposition 1, fully transmitted into output if the shock hits the economy in a period when prices are not adjusted. This causes an immediate increase in output of size "; however output returns to steady state in the following period. If, instead, the shock hits the economy in a period when all prices are reoptimized, there is no e¤ect on output. Since " t is a random walk and equally probable to hit the economy in all periods, averaging over the response in output in odd and even periods yields the proposition above for = 0 or = 1. A similar argument can be applied to the case when = 1.
Proposition 5 If 2 (0; 1) and 6 = 1, the expected cumulative e¤ect on output is given by
where
and A 1 and A 2 are given by (15) and (16).
The details of this derivation are in Appendix C. The properties of ( ; ) are described in the following result:
Proposition 6 If 2 (0; 1) and 6 = 1: ( ; ) is a strictly concave function of and arg max ( ; ) = 1 2
:
The proof is in Appendix D. The expected cumulative e¤ect on output is largest when there is uniform staggering. The next result follows as a corollary to Proposition 4 and Proposition 6.
Proposition 7 For all permissible values of and :
implying that C is a strictly concave (convex) function of , if prices are strategic complements (substitutes). If prices are neither strategic complements nor strategic substitutes, C is linear with respect to .
) and the steepest when prices are perfectly synchronized. Thus, moving a small distance from uniform staggering has a much smaller e¤ect on the expected cumulative e¤ect on output than moving the same distance from perfect synchronization. e¤ect on output has been normalized so that the e¤ect under perfect synchronization corresponds to one.
It turns out that, for a wide range of values of , output persistence is similar to the case of uniform staggering. Chari et al. (2000) argue that in order to match the U.S. business cycle, when prices are uniformly staggered, one needs = 0:05. Then, even for values of as low as 0:2, the model is able to generate a substantial persistence. One can further assess this claim by mapping the associated values of into the corresponding FK index. Figure 2 plots the relation between this index and the expected cumulative e¤ect on output, expressed as a fraction of the response under uniform staggering. For instance, when the FK index is 0:25, the expected cumulative e¤ect on output is 97 percent of the response with uniform staggering. Increasing the amount of synchronization so that the FK index is 0:5, the expected To understand the reason for this highly non-linear relation between and C ( ; ), consider how prices are set. The price level is
in odd periods and
in even periods. 4 Assuming that t is odd, one can write the optimal reset price in (17) as
Suppose that is low, so that a large fraction of all …rms are reoptimizing, and that price setters take E t p t+1 as given. Then, because A 1 is a monotonically increasing function of (see (15)), the optimal price will be heavily in ‡uenced by the money supply and little by past and future prices, and vice versa. But price setters rationally realize that next period's optimal price will be set according to the condition
Here, a low implies that a small fraction of all …rms are reoptimizing and that the optimal price will be heavily in ‡uenced by past and future prices and little by the money supply. Substituting this equation into (22), imposing E t m t+1 = m t and rearranging, we get
2 . A higher A 1 A 2 implies that price setters are more forward-looking, in the sense that they place a larger weight on E t p t+2 and a smaller weight on m t . For a given , A 1 A 2 depends primarily on (1 ). As a consequence, the in ‡uence by future optimal prices on this period's optimal price is the largest when = 1 2
. The concavity of A 1 A 2 with respect to implies that, as we move away from = 1 2 , today's optimal price is still heavily in ‡uenced by future optimal prices and less by the money supply. Therefore, small deviations from uniform staggering have small e¤ects on the price-setting behavior.
The full model
The simple model in the previous section provides a convenient and analytically tractable framework but is too simplistic to be realistic. I therefore extend the analysis to incorporate the basic building blocks that characterize the canonical New Keynesian framework. On the demand side, households maximize utility and the central bank implements an interest rate rule. On the supply side, there are monopolistically competitive, pro…t-maximizing …rms, with staggered price setting. I make two modi…cations to the baseline New Keynesian framework. First, the elasticity of demand varies along the demand curve and capital is …rm-speci…c. Second, the economy consists of many sectors and prices are uniformly staggered between sectors, but there is some synchronization within sectors. The …rst modi…cation, underlined by Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007) , introduces real rigidities which help to reconcile the New Keynesian model with micro evidence on the frequency of price adjustment. The second modi…cation is consistent with empirical studies of the degree of synchronization in price setting; see e.g. Cornille and Dossche (2006) .
Households
The economy consists of a large number of sectors. The representative household derives utility from the consumption of composite goods, according to the following generalized (Kimball) aggregator:
where C it denotes consumption of the composite good in sector i 2 [0; 1] and C t is aggregate consumption. Each composite good consists of a large number of brands, produced in each sector, from which the household derives utility according to the 14 aggregator:
where C ijt denotes consumption of brand j 2 [0; 1] in sector i. The household allocates consumption expenditure between the di¤erent brands in di¤erent sectors to
where P ijt denotes the price of brand j in sector i, subject to (25) and (26) for a given C t . The decision can be seen as sequential: in the …rst step, the household allocates consumption across sectors and then, in the second step, allocates across brands within each sector. Solving this problem backwards yields that demand for brand j in sector i is given by
is the price level in sector i, and
Taking (27) as given, it follows that demand for the sector i composite good is given by
is the aggregate price level, and
Demand for a speci…c brand thus depends on the brand's relative price in the sector, but also on the sector's relative price level and aggregate demand. The representative household solves the intertemporal problem:
where 2 (0; 1) is the household's subjective discount factor and
is the number of working hours supplied, subject to the budget constraint
where B t denotes bond holdings, R t is the gross nominal interest rate, W t is the nominal wage, and t is dividends from …rm ownership. The associated …rst order conditions for consumption and bond holdings reduce to the Euler equation
where t = Pt P t 1 is the gross in ‡ation rate. In addition, the …rst order condition for labor supply is
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Firms
Brand j in sector i is produced by a monopolist with technology
where N ijt denotes the …rm's input of labor, rented on the perfectly competitive, economy-wide labor market, and capital is assumed to be …xed at the …rm level. and set in a staggered fashion. In particular, the …rms in the …rst cohort in each sector set their prices at time t = 0; N; 2N; :::, the second cohort at t = 1; N + 1; 2N + 1; :::, and so on. This assumed price setting behavior has two important implications. First, prices are uniformly staggered at the aggregate level because a constant fraction of all prices are reset in each period. Second, when not all cohorts are of equal size, there is some degree of synchronization at the level of the individual sector. This speci…cation captures, in a stylized way, the idea that there is much more coordination within sectors than in the aggregate. Given these restrictions, a …rm's objective is to maximize the pro…t stream:
where E ij t denotes the …rm's time t expectations operator and
is the …rm's nominal stochastic discount factor, subject to the demand and technological constraints in (27) and (31). This implies the price setting rule
ijt is the marginal cost and (X ijt ) =
is the elasticity of demand, at market share
, between brands in the sector. As discussed in Kimball (1995) , the generalized aggregator function allows the generation of any desired shape of the individual …rm's demand curve, by using di¤erent speci…cations of G (X ijt ). As customary in the literature, I restrict my attention to the case when 0 (X ijt ) < 0, so that a …rm's elasticity of demand is a decreasing function of its market share. Such a speci…cation is consistent with, e.g., the imperfect information model in Ball and Romer (1990) , where a price increase drives away more old customers than a price decrease attracts new ones. The fear of losing customers makes …rms reluctant to change their prices and slows down price adjustment.
Price setting
To understand how the varying elasticity of demand and …rm-speci…c capital a¤ect price setting, it is instructive to log-linearize the price setting condition above, which, after some manipulations, reads
where s t is aggregate real marginal cost. In addition to expected movements in aggregate marginal cost, the …rm should also respond to expected movements in the gap between the sector's and the aggregate price level. This gap depends on the degree of synchronization in price setting.
Consider …rst the case when prices are uniformly staggered at the sector level. Price setting within sectors is staggered and demand is being reallocated between …rms in the same sector. However, because the proportion of reoptimizers is the same in all sectors, all …rms, regardless of which sector they belong to, set the same price, whenever they are able to reoptimize. As a consequence, p it = p t and there is no reallocation of demand between sectors. In this case, (33) reduces to
which is similar to the price setting condition in Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007) . The parameter A =
1+&
1 captures the e¤ect of the varying demand elasticity. The parameter is the steady state elasticity of a …rm's demand elasticity with respect to its relative price, & = 1 1 is the steady state markup, and is the steady state elasticity of substitution between brands. Consider a …rm contemplating raising its price, following an increase in marginal cost. The …rm realizes that the price increase also lowers its market share in the sector and thus makes its demand curve more elastic. This reduces the "pass-through" from marginal cost into prices, and the higher is, the stronger this e¤ect, as the demand elasticity rises more when the price increases.
The parameter D = 1 1+ !pA captures the e¤ect of …rm-speci…c capital, where
is the elasticity of a …rm's marginal cost with respect to its demand. A …rm increasing its price, following an increase in marginal cost, also reduces its demand and thereby its marginal cost, which reduces the desire to further increase the price. The higher ! p is, the stronger is this e¤ect, as the …rm's marginal cost falls more when demand falls.
If we instead assume that prices are perfectly synchronized, all …rms in a sector change their prices at the same time and there is no reallocation of demand between …rms in the same sector. However, because price setting is coordinated within sectors, and prices are staggered at the aggregate level, demand will be reallocated between sectors. Since p ijt = p it in this case, the price setting condition in (33) reduces to
The parameter B = 1 1+ !p captures the e¤ect of …rm-speci…c capital, where is the steady state elasticity of substitution between di¤erent product categories (sectors). Analogous to the argument above, …rm-speci…c capital reduces the desired price increase. But here the reduction in marginal cost occurs because demand is reallocated between sectors. Because the …rm's market share, X ijt , is constant, there is no real rigidity from the Kimball aggregator.
As I shall argue below, for a reasonable calibration, AD is much smaller than B; in other words, there are more real rigidities within than between sectors. Comparing (34) and (36) we see that the e¤ect on prices, following an increase in marginal cost, is smaller, and output is more persistent, when prices are uniformly staggered, than when they are perfectly synchronized. Supposedly, which will be con…rmed in the next section, there is a negative relationship between the degree of synchronization and the persistence in output. To determine the quantitative properties of this 6 Subtracting E t N 1 X k=0 k p it+k from both sides of (33) and rearranging yields
Imposing p ijt = p it+k 8k 0, rearranging and dividing by 
Aggregate dynamics
The model is closed by assuming that monetary policy is implemented by an interest rate rule, which in log-linearized form reads:
and " r t is a white noise process with …nite variance. Table 1 summarizes the calibration, where one period is assumed to be one quarter. This implies a steady state annual interest rate of about 5 percent and log utility in consumption and leisure. Following Carrillo et al. (2007) , the degree of interest rate smoothing is assumed to be relatively low, while shocks to the interest rate rule are highly persistent. I also adopt their speci…cation of the coe¢ cients in the interest rate rule.
I set to 11 and to 1=2 in order to match the high price elasticity between brands and the low price elasticity between product categories, as estimated by, e.g., Hausman et al. (1994) and, more recently, Levin and Yun (2008) ; this implies a 10 percent steady state markup. The value of implies that, without nominal rigidities, the "pass-through" from marginal cost into prices is 23 percent. The value of corresponds to a labor share of 2=3 and ! p = 0:5. These values imply AD B = 0:1276, con…rming the conjecture that a reasonable calibration assigns more real rigidities within than between sectors. This is because between sectors there is i) no real rigidity from the Kimball aggregator, as the elasticity of demand is solely a function of a …rm's market share in the sector and ii) little real rigidity from …rm-speci…c capital, as the demand elasticity between product categories is very small.
Prices are assumed to be …xed for one year, i.e., N = 4. What remains is to set Quantitatively, I …nd that the choice of sequence has a small impact on the expected cumulative e¤ect on output; I therefore restrict attention in the text to the monotonically declining sequence where 1 2 3 4 . 8 Figure 4 plots the mapping between the FK index and the size of the cohorts under this assumption. To explore how deviations from uniform staggering a¤ect aggregate output in this model, I again calculate the expected cumulative e¤ect on output, for various values on the FK index.
9 Figure 5 plots this relationship as a fraction of the response under uniform staggering. As discussed in the previous section, an economy with uniformly staggered prices produces a much more persistent response in output than an economy where prices are perfectly synchronized. In the latter case, the expected cumulative e¤ect on output is only about 35 percent of the response under uniform staggering. This is almost as low as without real rigidities from either …rm-speci…c capital or the Kimball aggregator, i.e., with a rental market for capital (B = D = 1) and the CES aggregator function (A = 1), corresponding to the dashed line in Figure  5 . 10 In this case, AD B = 1 and the "synchronization term" in (33) drops out, so that output dynamics is una¤ected by the degree of synchronization in price setting.
But we are primarily interested in the empirically more realistic case when prices at the sector level are neither uniformly staggered nor perfectly synchronized. In other words, how the output persistence arising from the interaction between real rigidities and staggering is a¤ected by prices being partially synchronized. As in the two-period model, the relationship between the degree of synchronization in price setting and the expected cumulative e¤ect on output is non-linear. Starting from a situation with uniform staggering and introducing a small amount of synchronization, hence decreasing the reallocation of demand between …rms in the same sector but increasing the reallocation of demand between di¤erent sectors has a smaller e¤ect on the expected cumulative e¤ect on output than performing the opposite experiment. When the FK index is 0.25, 96 percent of the uniformly staggered response remains; when the FK index is 0.5, 85 percent remains. For empirically plausible values of the FK index, uniform staggering provides a reasonably close approximation to aggregate dynamics under the true price setting structure. The basic results from the simple model in Section 3 carries over to this more realistic model.
Conclusion
Staggered price setting is crucial in creating persistent e¤ects on output following a monetary policy shock. In the literature, it is routinely assumed that a constant fraction of …rms reoptimize their prices each period, so there is no synchronization. In the present paper, I relax this assumption and allow for various degrees of synchronization in price setting. The main result is that deviations from uniform staggering have modest e¤ects on persistence. Aggregate dynamics in the standard uniformly staggered pricing model is a reasonably accurate approximation of the dynamics in a more realistic model, where prices are neither uniformly staggered nor perfectly synchronized.
The intuitive reason for this is that non-adjusters have a disproportionately large in ‡uence on the behavior of the aggregate economy. When prices are strategic complements, the failure of a small group of price setters to reoptimize is su¢ cient to create persistent output e¤ects. This result is coherent with those obtained in, e.g., Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989) and Fehr and Tyran (2008) , who …nd that when agents vary in their ability to form expectations, rational agents tend to mimic the behavior of those less sophisticated so that the latter have a disproportionately large e¤ect on the aggregate outcome. Similarly, Carvalho (2006) and Dixon and Kara (2007) …nd that, in economies with the same average duration of price or wage contracts, a monetary policy shock yields a larger and more persistent response, when a few contracts of longer durations are present. In the present model, a small step away from uniform staggering has a small e¤ect on aggregate dynamics after a monetary policy shock, but a small step away from perfect synchronization leads to a considerable increase in persistence.
Appendices
A Solving for output dynamics in the two-period model Let x t denote the optimal price at t . Combining (2) with (5) and (6), one can write
Given the assumptions about price setting described in the text, the price level is
in odd periods, and
in even periods. Combining these with (A.1), yields
I guess that the equilibrium law of motion for x t is of the form
Repeated substitution of this into (A.4) gives that the optimal price must satisfy
in even periods, and
in odd periods. It follows that the solution to ( 1 ; 2 ; 1 ; 2 ) is obtained by solving the system
It is easy to verify that I = 1 I , and that one can write (A.5) as
Substituting this into A.2 and (A.3), the price level can be written as .13) in odd periods, and as A.14) in even periods. Substituting these into (5), aggregate demand can be written as (A.15) in odd periods, and as .16) in even periods. Assuming that t is odd, lagging (A.12) one period, taking into account that t 1 is even, and substituting this into (A.15), aggregate demand can be written as
(A.17) or using that m t = m t 1 + " t as
It follows from (A.16) that aggregate demand at t 1 is given by
Solving for x t 2 and substituting this into (A.18), yields
Similar reasoning when t is even, yields
The equilibrium law of motion for aggregate output can thus be written as (8) in the text, where the coe¢ cients are given by the system in (9) -(12).
B The expected cumulative e¤ect on output in the two-period model
The economy is initially in steady state and is hit by a shock of size " in t. Recalling that y t = I y t 1 + ! I " t , it then follows that y t = ! I ";
and that
which can be used to calculate the following conditional expectations:
E t (y t+2k j t odd) = 1 E t (y t+2k 1 j t odd) = 1 2 E t (y t+2k 2 j t odd)
= :::
E t (y t+2k j t even) = 2 E t (y t+2k 1 j t even) = 1 2 E t (y t+2k 2 j t even) = :::
Putting these together, the unconditional expectations are given by
2)
It follows that
and that one can write
C Proof of Proposition 5
The expected cumulative e¤ect on output can, using (9) - (12), be rewritten as
Next, using (18) The last line follows by using the de…nitions of A 1 and A 2 , so that the nominator in the second term at the third line can be written as First, write ( ; ) as 2 S (1 + ) + 2 (1 + ) S:
Di¤erentiating this with respect to and setting the resulting derivative to zero yields From the de…nition of S, the term inside the bracket is positive, and one can write
From the de…nition of G, the term inside the bracket is positive, and one can write
From the de…nition of F , the term inside the bracket is positive, and one can write . Next, I show that ( ; ) is a strictly concave function (has a negative second derivative) of . Let F ( ; ), G ( ; ), and S ( ; ) be de…ned as above, with the second derivatives with respect to given by Using the de…nition of G, these can be written as
(D.10)
The condition in (D.10) is stronger, so it is su¢ cient to prove this inequality, which, using the de…nition of F , can be written as It follows from the de…nition of F that the inequality in (D.13) is always satis…ed.
E Results for alternative permutation sequences
There are 6 unique permutation sequences, listed in the table below. The monotoni- cally declining sequence used in the main text corresponds to the sequence (1; 2; 3; 4). Also listed in the table is the expected cumulative e¤ect on output, as a fraction of the uniformly staggered response, for F K = 0:25; 0:5; 0:75 for each sequence.
